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ABSTRACT
STABILITY OF COVERS UNDER DIFFERENT
RIGHTS STRUCTURES
AKBULUT, Çi¼gdem
M.A., Department of Economics
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Semih Koray
January 2012
A countrys social welfare depends on rmsprots and consumers surplus.
Given unions of countries, a countrys aim is to maximize its own social welfare
when it decides to enter or exit a union. For examining unions, we use the
notion of a cover as elaborated in Koray (2007).We utilize the ndings of ·Ilk¬l¬ç
(2010) about the Cournot equilibrium in our setting to examine core stability
and e¢ ciency of covers of countries.We adapt di¤erent rightsstructures based
on; free exit, free entry, approved exit and approved entry introduced by Sertel
(1992) to the context of covers, along with introducing some stronger structures
and study how stability of covers varies when linkage costs are imposed upon
countries.
Keywords: Social Welfare, Cover, Free Exit, Free Entry, Approved Exit, Ap-
proved Entry,Core Stability, E¢ ciency, Pareto E¢ ciency.
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ÖZET
FARKLI HAKLAR YAPILARI ALTINDA ÖRTÜLER·IN
KARARLILI¼GI
AKBULUT, Çi¼gdem
Yüksek Lisans, Ekonomi Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Semih Koray
Ocak 2012
Bir ülkenin sosyal refah¬ülke içerisindeki rmalar¬n kbarlar¬na ve tüketici art¬¼g¬na
ba¼gl¬d¬r. Verilen bir birlik yap¬s¬alt¬nda, bir ülkenin bir birli¼ge kat¬lma veya bir
birlikten ayr¬lma kararlar¬, ülkenin sosyal refah¬n¬en çoklas¸t¬rmak amac¬yla al¬n-
maktad¬r. Birlikleri incelemek için örtüleri Koray (2007)de ele al¬nd¬¼g¬biçimiyle
kullan¬yoruz. "Ülke örtülerinin" çekirdek kararl¬l¬¼g¬ve verimlili¼gini incelemek için,
·Ilk¬l¬ç (2010) ¬n ele al¬nan ba¼glamda hesap edilmi¸s, Cournot dengesi bulgular¬ndan
yararlan¬yoruz. Sertel (1992) in serbest giri¸s, serbest ç¬k¬¸s, izinli giri¸s ve izinli ç¬k¬¸s
temelinde tan¬mlad¬¼g¬haklar yap¬lar¬n¬örtü kavram¬na uyarl¬yor ve daha güçlü
bas¸ka baz¬haklar yap¬lar¬n¬da tan¬ml¬yoruz.Farkl¬haklar yap¬lar¬alt¬nda kararl¬,
Pareto verimli ve verimli örtüleri belirliyoruz ve ülkeleraras¬ ba¼glant¬ kurmaya
maliyet yüklenmesinin örtülerin kararl¬l¬¼g¬n¬nas¬l etkiledi¼gini inceliyoruz.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Sosyal Refah, Örtü, Sebest Giri¸s, Serbest Ç¬k¬¸s, ·Izinli Giri¸s,
·Izinli Ç¬k¬¸s, Çekirdek Kararl¬l¬¼g¬, Verimlilik, Pareto Verimlilik.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Network Theory is one of the main theories to understand social communication and
economic relations. Specically, in economics, network theory is used for improv-
ing our understanding of trade agreements, information sharing, political alliances,
employer-employee relationships, professional collaborations, friendships and part-
nerships. Especially, in the last twenty years, there have been new developments
in this area. New models such as the Coauthor Model, the Distance Based Model,
and the Connections Model due to Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) are established to
explain di¤erent kinds of network relations. As another example, networks are also
used in modelling competitions and bargaining in markets and rms, Kranton and
Minehart (1998), Corominas- Bosch (1999) and Rahmi Ilkilic (2010) did. In all these
works, d¬¤erent notions of stability and e¢ ciency are dened, and several allocation
rules such as the Player Based Flexible Network Rule, the Linked Based Flexible
Network Rule are introduced. There is, however, still some considerable space for
further improvements in this area.
In network models, connections are formed bilaterally, in other words, they are
represented as a link between two agents. On the other hand, not every relation
needs to be bilateral. As an example, agreements among rms and nations like the
Customs Union, NAFTA, the European Union or work groups of researchers reect
multilateral relations, rather than bilateral.
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As one possible and motivating scenario, we may consider trade agreements
among nations. Consider countries A, B and C. Without loss of generality, these
countries are assumed to have the same demand and the same economic, technolog-
ical structure. For simplicity, we take one kind of product which can be produced
in all countries with the same technology. If A, B, and C come together and form
a union, trade will be free among them. Note that, in a union among A, B, and C,
for instance, C can also be in a union with other countries, say, D and E. However,
a product which is produced in a country can only be sold in that country and the
countries that are in a union with this country. For a country, the social welfare
can be measured as the sum of the consumerssurplus, and the prot of the rm.
Given the other countriesunion structure, a country will decide to join a union,
if that maximizes its own social welfare. Before we model the problem, we rst
consider what kind of concepts should be used for explaining a union structure in
other words, multilateral links.
In order to deal with multilateral connections, rst of all, it is not convenient to
use networks where, links represent bilateral relation between two agents. Therefore,
a network does not reect the idea of union. Secondly, we may use cooperative
game with a partitional coalition structure. In other words, we may take each union
as a coalition.
Denition 1 Let jN j = n and let 8i 2 N , Bi 2 2Nnf;g. A coalition structure is a
partition B = fB1; : : : ; BKg of the n players such that
[
Bk = N and for all h 6= k;
Bk
T
Bh = ;.
In this denition, the intersection of any two distinct coalitions must be empty.
This means that, if a nation is in a union, then it cannot be in another union.
However, in our model and in reality, a country can be in di¤erent unions. As an
example, the USA is both in NAFTA (The North American Free Trade Agreement)
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with Canada and Mexico and in DR-CAFTA (Central America Free Trade Agree-
ment) with Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Thus we
need to have di¤erent structures to examine multilateral relations considering possi-
ble overlappings between di¤erent unions. For this purpose, conferencestructures
and coverstructures which are introduced by Myerson (1980) and Sertel (1992)
respectively, can be used.
Denition 2 A conference S is a set of two or more players (who might meet to-
gether to discuss their cooperative plans). A conference structure Q is any collection
of conferences. Thus, Q = fS : S  N and jSj  2g:
As we see, in conference structure a coalition has at least two members, so
isolations are not allowed and also inclusions between two distinct coalitions are
allowed. In most economic and trade agreements like the European Union, the
Customs Union, once a set of countries agrees to have the same alliance and rules,
then subsets are not allowed to make the some other alliance and rules. In other
words, if A, B, C are in a union with a trade agreement then B and C are not
allowed to make the some other trade agreement. Moreover a country can choose
to be alone, in other words, it need not join a union. Therefore, in our study, since
inclusions between any distinct coalitions are not allowed, and isolations are allowed,
we use covers introduced in Sertel(1992) in our model. The denitions pertaining
to covers are borrowed from Koray (2007).
Denition 3 Given the set of players N; a hyperlink H is an element of 2Nnf;g:
A subset C of 2N is said to be a cover for N players if
[
H2C
H = N and @H; H 0 2 C
such that H  H 0.We will denote the set of all covers for N by CN .
As we notice, in cover structure a hyperlink (we will use hyperlink or hyperedge
instead of a coalition in conference structure) may consist of one agent but inclusions
between any distinct hyperlinks are not allowed.
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Example 1 Let N = f1; 2; 3; 4g and C 2 CN , C = f12; 234g. The cover C has two
hyperlinks such that 1 and 2 are in a union and 2; 3; 4 are in a di¤erent union.
In our research, we will investigate several questions. The rst one is, given a
cover structure, how much a rm in a country should produce so as to maximize
its own prot. We will investigate whether this Cournot equilibrium is unique or
not. Here, the unions that the country is in, are important to nd the Cournot
equilibrium for the prot- maximizing quantities of the rms. We will nd the
prot of the rm, and the consumerssurplus in a country whose sum will represent
the social welfare of a country.
The second main question will be to determine whether a cover is core stable or
not. For this, we will use k-stability and core stability concepts that Koray (2007)
introduces for covers. For a country, to exit from or entry to a union may or may
not require approval. Sertel (1992) introduced four possible membership rights in
an abstract setting. In this aspect, either both exit and entry require approval,
only one of them requires approval (i.e., approved entry- free exit or vice versa) , or
none of them requires approval. Under approved entry condition, if in a union, at
least one countrys social welfare strictly decreases when another country joins, then
this country will veto the entry of the new member. Similarly, under approved exit
condition, if in a union, at least one countrys social welfare strictly decreases when
another country leaves, then this country will not approve the exit of the member.
Stability in entry- exit conditions for hedonic games are dened and examined in
Karakaya (2011). We will dene four membership rights for covers, in addition to
this, we will introduce and dene strongly approved entry condition as well. We will
investigate core stability notion in all cases respectively. We will investigate e¢ cient
and Pareto e¢ cient covers.
While examining core stability under di¤erent exit-entry conditions, we will rst
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consider entry without cost. However, in reality, countries pay cost such as forming
institutions, applying the criteria of trade agreements, while entering a union. Sim-
ilary, the incumbants in a union may incur a cost for the new comer. Therefore, we
will do the same analysis considering entry cost.
As we mentioned before, we will assume that countries have the same demand
and the same economic, technological structure. For simplicity, we will take one
kind of product which can be produced in all countries with the same technology.
In other words, countries will be symmetric. But in reality, they are not. Hence, as
a further research, countrys di¤erences can be considered, and the same questions
in terms of this di¤erence can be answered.
In the literature, a similar research done about this subject is due to Ilkilic
(2010). In his research, he models a bipartite network where links connect rms
with markets. He looks at the Cournot game in which rms decide how much to sell
at each market that they are connected to. He then considers the market analysis
and examines the mergers and cartel formations. In Ilkilic (2010), he assumes that
rms have convex quadratic costs and markets have a¢ ne inverse demand functions.
Under these assumptions, he mainly nds that the Cournot game has a unique Nash
equilibrium, and for the two rms the Cournot equilibrium di¤ers from the no-merger
situation if they share a market. For cartel solution, he establishes an algorithm to
calculate the optimal cartel supply by each rm and consumption at each market.
We will use the assumptions of Ilkilic (2010) to model our problem.
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CHAPTER 2
MODEL
Now let us model our scenario formally and state the problem. Countries in our
scenario are considered as the agents, so we have n countries. The unions which
they form are considered as hyperlinks.
We will use the assumptions of Ilkilic (2010) in our model so, rms have convex-
quadratic costs and markets have a¢ ne inverse demand functions. Let C 2 CN
be a cover, H 2 C be a hyperlink. Ilkilic (2010) assumes that given a quantity
vector QC ; the price at the country i is pi(QC) = i   ici where i; i > 0 and
ci = qii +
X
k2Nnfig st
9H2C: i;k2H
qik is the total consumption at the country i.
Ilkilic (2010) assumes that for a rm j the total cost of production is Tj(QC) =
j
2
s2j where j > 0 and sj = qjj+
X
k2Nnfjg st
9H2C: k;j2H
qkj is the total supply by a rm j. Then
the prot function of a rm in country j is
j(QC) =
X
i2Nnfjg st
9H2C: i;j2H
(iqij   iqijci) + jqjj   jqjjcj  
j
2
s2j :
Ilkilic (2010) assumes that qij is the supply of a rm j to the market i. Here,
if i and j are in the same union (hyperlink) then, qij is the supply of a rm in the
country j to the country i. Note that a rm in a country trades in its own country.
If i and j are in the same union (i.e., if 9H 2 C : i; j 2 H ), then the best response
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of a rm in the country j supplying to the country i (so as to maximize its prot)
is:
qij =
8>><>>:
1
2i+j
(i   j
X
t2Nnfig st
9H2C: t;j2H
qtj   i
X
k2Nnfjg st
9H2C: i;k2H
qik) if
@j
@qij
 0
0 if @j
@qij
< 0
or in other words,
qij =
(
i j(sj qij)  i(ci qij)
2i+j
if @j
@qij
 0
0 if @j
@qij
< 0
Note that as Ilkilic (2010) assumes, we will also assume qij  0, 8i; j 2 N: For
networks, Ilkilic (2010) shows that the game has a unique Cournot equilibrium. To
do this, he constructs the problem as a Linear Complementarity Problem (LCP),
and shows that the matrix in LCP is positive denite. Hence, he concludes that this
LCP has the unique solution. Therefore, qij is the unique Cournot equilibrium for
a rm in the country j supplying to the country i:
Then the consumerssurplus CSi(QC) and social welfare SWi(QC) of the country
i will be; CSi(QC) =
i(c

i )
2
2
where ci denotes ci in the equilibrium and SWi(QC) =
i(QC) +CSi(QC).Remember that we will assume that all countries have the same
demand and the same economic, technological structure. Hence, we will assume
that 8i; j 2 N;i = j = ; i = j =  and i = j = . Note that, if i and j are
in the same union (hyperlink) then, qij is the supply of a rm in the country j to
the country i.
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CHAPTER 3
DEFINITIONS AND NOTATIONS
Koray (2007) denes the concepts of value and allocation function for covers as
below.
Denition 4 A function v : CN ! R is called a value function for CN if v(C) = 0
whenever jHj = 1 for all H 2 C. Given a value function v : CN ! R, a function
Y : CN ! RN is called an allocation rule associated with v if, for any C 2 CN , one
has v(C) =
P
i2N
Yi(C).
Let v : CN ! R be a value function and Y an allocation rule associated with v.
Sertel (1992) introduced four possible membership rights in an abstract setting.
In this aspect, either both exit and entry of a country to a union require approval,
only one of them requires approval (i.e., approved entry-free exit or vice versa) ,
or none of them requires approval. In order to investigate the stability notion, we
will consider these four membership rights and we will dene two more membership
rights. For this, we will utilize k stability, core stability and core denitions that
Koray (2007) introduces. Koray (2007) denes T - function on C; and we will use
this concept in our denitions.
Denition 5 Given a cover C 2 CN ;and T 2 2Nnf;g; a function f : C ! 2Nnf;g
is called a T -function on C if 8 H 2 C : f(H)  H and Hnf(H)  T:
We will dene obtainable covers under membership rights.Sertel (1992) intro-
duces abbreviations for free exit (FX), free entry (FE), approved exit (AX) and
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approved entry (AE). We will use these abbreviations.
Denition 6 (Free Exit- Free Entry). Given a value function v 2 V and an
allocation rule Y associated with v, let C 2 CN and T 2 2Nnf;g. A cover C 0 2 CN
is said to be obtainable from C via T relative to v and Y under free exit- free entry
condition, if C 0  ff(H)SP : H 2 C;P 2 2TgS 2T for some T -function f on
C:Free exit- free entry condition is denoted by FX-FE.
Note that under approved entry condition, if in a union, at least one countrys
social welfare strictly decreases when another country joins, then this country will
veto the entry of the new member. Similarly, under approved exit condition, if in a
union, at least one countrys social welfare strictly decreases when another country
leaves, then this country will not approve the exit of the member. Hence, in three
denitions below, the second condition represents this situation.
Denition 7 (Free Exit- Approved Entry) Given a value function v 2 V and
an allocation rule Y associated with v, let C, C 0 2 CN and T 2 2Nnf;g. A cover
C 0 2 CN is said to be obtainable from C via T relative to v and Y under free exit-
approved entry condition, if the following conditions hold ;
1) C 0  ff(H)SP : H 2 C;P 2 2TgS 2T for some T -function f on C;
2) 8H 0 2 C 0 such that [H 0TT 6= ; and @H 2 C : H 0 = H and 9H 2 C :
(H 0nH) 6= ;, (H 0nH)  T ] we have 8i 2 H 0 : Yi(C 0)  Yi(C).
Free exit- approved entry condition is denoted by FX-AE.
Denition 8 (Approved Exit-Free Entry) Given a value function v 2 V and
an allocation rule Y associated with v, let C, C 0 2 CN and T 2 2Nnf;g. A cover
C 0 2 CN is said to be obtainable from C via T relative to v and Y under approved
exit- free entry condition, if the following conditions hold ;
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1) C 0  ff(H)SP : H 2 C;P 2 2TgS 2T for some T -function f on C,
2) 8H 2 C such that [HTT 6= ; and @H 0 2 C 0 : H 0 = H and 9H 0 2 C 0 :
(HnH 0)  T ] we have 8i 2 H : Yi(C 0)  Yi(C).
Approved exit- free entry condition is denoted by AX-FE.
Denition 9 (Approved Exit-Approved Entry) Given a value function v 2 V
and an allocation rule Y associated with v, let C, C 0 2 CN and T 2 2Nnf;g. A cover
C 0 2 CN is said to be obtainable from C via T relative to v and Y under approved
exit- approved entry condition, if the following conditions hold ;
1) C 0  ff(H)SP : H 2 C;P 2 2TgS 2T , for some T -function f on C ,
2) 8H 2 C such that [ @H 0 2 C 0 : H 0 = H] we have 8i 2 H : Yi(C 0)  Yi(C).
Approved exit- approved entry condition is denoted by AX-AE.
So far we have considered the membership rights under non-transferable payo¤s.
On the other hand, approved exit of a country from a union and approved entrance
of a country to a union can depend on the total social welfare of the countries in
that union.Therefore, we will dene membership rights under transferable payo¤s.
Denition 10 (Free Exit-Free Entry with Transferable Payo¤s) Given a
value function v 2 V and an allocation rule Y associated with v, let C 2 CN and
T 2 2Nnf;g. A cover C 0 2 CN is said to be obtainable from C via T relative to v and
Y under free exit- free entry with transferable payo¤s condition, if C 0  ff(H)SP :
H 2 C;P 2 2TgS 2T for some T -function f on C:
Note that under approved entry with transferable payo¤s condition, if the to-
tal social welfare of the union strictly decreases when another country joins, then
the union will veto the entry of the new member. Similarly, under approved exit
with transferable payo¤s condition, if the total social welfare of the union strictly
decreases when another country leaves, then the union will not approve the exit of
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the member. Hence, in below three denitions, the second condition represents this
situation.
Denition 11 (Free Exit-Approved Entry with Transferable Payo¤s)
Given a value function v 2 V and an allocation rule Y associated with v, let C,
C 0 2 CN and T 2 2Nnf;g. A cover C 0 2 CN is said to be obtainable from C
via T relative to v and Y under free exit- approved entry with transferable payo¤s
condition, if the following conditions hold ;
1) C 0  ff(H)SP : H 2 C;P 2 2TgS 2T for some T -function f on C;
2) 8H 0 2 C 0 such that [H 0TT 6= ; and @H 2 C : H 0 = H and 9H 2 C :
(H 0nH) 6= ;, (H 0nH)  T ] we have P
i2H0
Yi(C
0)  P
i2H0
Yi(C).
Denition 12 (Approved Exit- Free Entry with Transferable Payo¤s)
Given a value function v 2 V and an allocation rule Y associated with v, let C,
C 0 2 CN and T 2 2Nnf;g. A cover C 0 2 CN is said to be obtainable from C
via T relative to v and Y under approved exit- free entry with transferable payo¤s
condition, if the following conditions hold ;
1) C 0  ff(H)SP : H 2 C;P 2 2TgS 2T for some T -function f on C,
2) 8H 2 C such that [HTT 6= ; and @H 0 2 C 0 : H 0 = H and 9H 0 2 C 0 :
(HnH 0)  T ] we have P
i2H
Yi(C
0)  P
i2H
Yi(C).
Denition 13 (Approved Exit- Approved Entry with Transferable Pay-
o¤s) Given a value function v 2 V and an allocation rule Y associated with v,
let C, C 0 2 CN and T 2 2Nnf;g. A cover C 0 2 CN is said to be obtainable from
C via T relative to v and Y under approved exit- approved entry with transferable
payo¤s condition, if the following conditions hold ;
1) C 0  ff(H)SP : H 2 C;P 2 2TgS 2T , for some T -function f on C ,
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2) 8H 2 C such that [ @H 0 2 C 0 : H 0 = H] we have P
i2H
Yi(C
0)  P
i2H
Yi(C).
Let N = fi; j; kg and C, C 0 2 CN such that C = fij; jkg and C 0 = fij; jk; ikg.
Let T = fi; kg as the countries which deviate.When we pass from the cover C to
the cover C 0, by denitions of the four membership rights (FX-FE, FX-AE, AX-FE
and AX-AE), we do not consider the approval of the country j. However, in some
cases, in order to pass from C to C 0, the approval of j is needed as i and k form a
new union while they are still in a union with j in C 0. Now we form the denition
of free exit- strongly approved entry.
Denition 14 (Free Exit- Strongly Approved Entry ) Given a value function
v 2 V and an allocation rule Y associated with v, let C, C 0 2 CN and T 2 2Nnf;g.
A cover C 0 2 CN is said to be obtainable from C via T relative to v and Y under
strongly approved entry- free exit condition, if the following conditions hold ;
1) C 0  ff(H)SP : H 2 C;P 2 2TgS 2T for some T -function f on C;
2) 8H 0 2 C 0 such that [H 0TT 6= ; and @H 2 C : H 0 = H and 9H 2 C :
(H 0nH) 6= ;, (H 0nH)  T ] we have 8i 2 H 0 : Yi(C 0)  Yi(C).
3) 8H 0 2 C 0 such that [H 0TT 6= ; and 9H 2 C : H 0  H and 9H 00 2 C 0;
H 0 6= H 00 : (H 0TT )  H 00] we have 8i 2 H 0 : Yi(C 0)  Yi(C).
Free Exit- Strongly Approved Entry condition is denoted by FX-SAE.
According to the denition, under free exit- strongly approved entry, countries
can exit from their previous unions freely. However, if the deviating countries enter
to other unions or form new unions without exiting from their previous unions,
then the approval of the countries that are in unions with the deviating countries
previously is required.
Similarly we will dene approved exit- strongly approved entry condition.
Denition 15 (Approved Exit-Strongly Approved Entry) Given a value func-
tion v 2 V and an allocation rule Y associated with v, let C, C 0 2 CN and
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T 2 2Nnf;g. A cover C 0 2 CN is said to be obtainable from C via T relative
to v and Y under strongly approved entry- approved exit condition, if the following
conditions hold ;
1) C 0  ff(H)SP : H 2 C;P 2 2TgS 2T for some T -function f on C;
2) 8H 2 C such that [ @H 0 2 C 0 : H 0 = H] we have 8i 2 H : Yi(C 0)  Yi(C).
3) 8H 0 2 C 0 such that [H 0TT 6= ; and 9H 2 C : H 0  H and 9H 00 2 C 0;
H 0 6= H 00 : (H 0TT )  H 00] we have 8i 2 H 0 : Yi(C 0)  Yi(C).
Approved Exit- Strongly Approved Entry condition is denoted by AX-SAE.
Now we will give k-stability, core stability and core denitions that Koray (2007)
introduces.
Denition 16 Let C 2 CN and k 2 f1; :::; ng; and the exit- entry condition is given.
We say that C is k-stable relative to (v; Y ) under given exit- entry condition, if there
is no T 2 2Nnf;g with jT j  k such that 9C 0 2 CN obtainable from C via T relative
to (v; Y ) under given exit- entry condition condition with 8i 2 T : Yi (C 0)  Yi (C)
and 9j 2 T : Yj (C 0) > Yj (C). C is said to be strongly stable relative to (v; Y ) under
given exit- entry condition if C is k-stable relative to (v; Y ) for all k 2 f1; :::; ng
under given exit- entry condition.
Denition 17 Given a value function v 2 V , an allocation rule Y associated with
v, and exit- entry condition, let C, C 0 2 CN and T 2 2Nnf;g. We say that T can
improve upon C via C 0 relative to (v; Y ) under given exit- entry condition if C 0 is
obtainable from C via T relative to (v; Y ) under given exit- entry condition with
8i 2 T : Yi(C 0)  Yi(C) and 9j 2 T : Yj(C 0) > Yj(C).
Denition 18 A cover C 2 CN is said to be core stable relative to (v; Y ) under
given exit- entry condition if there is no T 2 2Nnf;g such that T can improve upon
C via some C 0 2 CN relative to (v; Y ) under given exit- entry condition.
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Note that core stability and strong stability are the same notions. But, core for
cover characterizes the allocations for e¢ cient covers such that no subset S  N
can deviate from the e¢ cient cover under the allocation rule.
Denition 19 Given a value function v 2 V and a cover C 2 CN ;an allocation
y 2 Rn for C is said to be core relative to (N , v) if P
i2N
yi  v(C) and 8S  N :P
i2S
yi  v^(CS) where v^(CS) = maxCS02CN v(CS0) and 8S  N;CS denotes a subset
of CN such that agents in NnS are isolated and agents in S are allowed to form any
hyperlink.
Koray (2007) introduces Pareto e¢ ciency and e¢ ciency for covers.
Denition 20 Let C 2 CN . We say that C is e¢ cient relative to v if v(C) =
maxC02CN v(C 0). Moreover, v is said to be Pareto e¢ cient relative to (v; Y ) if there
is no C 0 2 CN such that 8i 2 N : Yi(C 0)  Yi(C) and 9j 2 N : Yj(C 0) > Yj(C).
Ilkilic (2010) models a bipartite network where links connect rms with markets.
If we think that the rms in countries and the countries (markets) as in bipartite
network, we reach the below result,
Claim 1 Let C 2 CN , and let C 0 2 CN . Assume that the bipartite graphs of the
two covers are same. Then in the equilibrium, the social welfare of a country in the
cover C is equal to its social welfare in the cover C 0.
Proof. Let C 2 CN and let C 0 2 CN . Assume that the bipartite graphs of the two
covers are same. Let i 2 N;and let j 2 N; such that 9 H 2 C : i; j 2 H. Then since
the bipartite graphs of the two covers are same, so 9 H 0 2 C 0 : i; j 2 H 0. Hence,
by model assumptions, it follows that in the equilibrium, qij in C is equal to the
qij in C
0 and i(QC) = i(QC0); CSi(QC) = CSi(QC0); so, SWi(QC) = SWi(QC0):
Thus, in the equilibrium, the social welfare of a country in the cover C is equal to
its social welfare in the cover C 0.
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Example 2 N = f1; 2; 3; 4g: Let C 2 CN and let C 0 2 CN such that, C = f123; 4g
and C 0 = f12; 23; 13; 4g: Then the bipartite graph structures of the two covers are
same, so by Claim 1, in equilibrium, the social welfare of a country in the cover C
is equal to its social welfare in the cover C 0.
Hence, we can treat the cover structure as a bipartite graph structure between
rms in the countries and countries (markets) in our model. Therefore, we will
modify complete cover denition as below.
Denition 21 A cover C 2 CN is said to be complete-equivalent cover, if it is
composed of only one hyperlink which contains all players or 8 i; j 2 N ; 9 H 2 C
such that i; j 2 H:
Denition 22 A cover is said to be a single-centered star if the cover has at least
two hyperlinks, there exist unique i 2 N , such that 8H;H 0 2 C; HTH 0 = fig and
8H 2 C; jHj = 2 : In this case, we will call the unique element i as the center.A
cover is said to be a multi-centered star if the cover has at least two hyperlinks, there
exist S 2 2Nnf;; Ng, such that 8H;H 0 2 C; HTH 0 = S. In this case, we will call
S as the center.
Denition 23 Let C 2 CN : An agent i is isolated if 9!H 2 C such that i 2 H and
jHj = 1:
We dene degree concept in covers as follows;
Denition 24 Let C 2 CN . Let i 2 N . We dene the degree of i in C as follows;
degi(C) = jfj 2 Nnfig : 9H 2 C such that i; j 2 Hgj
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
4.1 Model without Linkage Cost
Proposition 1 The social welfare of each country in the complete- equivalent cover
in the equlilibrium is 
2n(2+n+n)
2(+n+n)2
. Social welfare of each country in the complete-
equivalent cover in equilibrium increases as the number of countries increases.
Proof. Let C 2 CN be a complete-equivalent cover including n countries. Since all
countries are identical, we have in equilibrium;
8i; j 2 N; qij = qji = q = (n+1)+n
i(QC) = j(QC) = nq
   n2(q)2   
2
n2(q)2
CSi(QC) =
n2(q)2
2
so we get,
SWi(QC) = nq
   n2(q)2(
2
+ 
2
) = 
2n(2+n+n)
2(+n+n)2
Now, the derivative of social welfare with respect to the number of countries,
n; is @(SWi(QC))
@n
= 
22
(+n+n)3
since we assume ; ;  > 0 so, @(SWi(QC))
@n
> 0, hence
the social welfare of each country in the complete-equivalent cover in equilibrium
increases as the number of countries increases.
Remark 1 Let C 2 CN . In the model, rms are prot maximizers. Hence, as Ilkilic
(2010) presents for networks, given a cover C 2 CN , the Cournot equilibrium for
quantity levels can be written in the matrix form,   + DCQC  0. Ilkilic (2010)
forms the matrix DC for networks, and shows that DC can be formed as DC = RTR
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where R has full rank. Hence, Ilkilic (2010) concludes that DC is positive denite
and so det(DC) > 0:
Before we show a monotonicity result, let us look at an example;
Example 3 N = fi; j; kg: Let C = fij; kg and let C 0 = fij; ikg: We will show
that adding the hyperlink ik decreases the social welfare of j:In C; since there is no
connection between i and k;so qik = 0 and qki = 0: In C 0, in equilibrium, qik  0 and
qki  0:We will show that the increase in qik and qki will e¤ect the quantity levels,
qjj; qij; qji; qii in equilibrium. Then we will show that SWj(QC0) < SWj(QC). By
Remark 1, the Cournot equilibrium for quantity levels can be written in the matrix
form,  +DCQC  0 and det(DC) > 0:Here
DC =
2664
2 +    0
 2 +  0 
 0 2 +  
0   2 + 
3775 and QC =
2664
qii
qij
qji
qjj
3775
For the cover C, the Cournot equilibrium for quantity levels can be written in the
equation form, such that, Fl : R4 ! R where qii; qij; qji; qjj; are dependent variables,
and qik; qki are independent variables, so,
F1(qii; qij; qji; qjj) = (2 + )qii   + (qji + qvi)+ (qij + qiv) = 0
F2(qii; qij; qji; qjj) = (2 + )qij   + qjj+ (qii + qiv) = 0
F3(qii; qij; qji; qjj) = (2 + )qji   + (qii + qvi)+ qjj = 0
F4(qii; qij; qji; qjj) = (2 + )qjj   + qij+ qji = 0
Now, Fl is linear 8l 2 f1; :::; 4g and @(F1;:::;F4)@(qii;:::;qjj) = det(DC) > 0:By Cramers rule
we have, given qtr such that t; r 2 fi; jg,
@qtr
@qik
=
  @(F1;F2;F3;F4)
@(qii;:::;qik;:::;qjj)
@(F1;:::;F4)
@(qii;:::;qjj)
=
 

2666664
@F1
@qii
   @F1
@qik
   @F1
@qjj
...
...
...
@F4
@qii
: : : @F4
@qik
: : : @F4
@qjj
3777775

2666664
@F1
@qii
   @F1
@qtr
   @F1
@qjj
...
...
...
@Fe
@qii
: : : @F4
@qtr
: : : @F4
@qjj
3777775
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similarly, @qtr
@qki
can be written. Let x =
264
@F1
@qik
...
@F4
@qik
375
(4x1)
be the column vector, then,
x =
2664


0
0
3775 similarly, let y =
264
@F1
@qki
...
@F4
@qki
375
(4x1)
be the column vector, then, y =
2664

0

0
3775
Note that ; ;  > 0.Then, @qii
@qik
=
@qij
@qik
= ( 1)(3
2+7+22)
3(+2)(3+2)
< 0;
@qji
@qik
=
@qjj
@qik
=
(+22)
3(+2)(3+2)
> 0 and @qii
@qki
=
@qji
@qki
= ( 1)(6+6
2)
3(+2)(3+2)
< 0;
@qij
@qki
=
@qjj
@qki
= 3
3(+2)(3+2)
>
0.Now, by total di¤erentiation, dSWj(QC) =
@SWj(QC)
@qik
dqik +
@SWj(QC)
@qki
dqki. Then,
@SWj(QC)
@qik
= ( 2)(3+)
(3+2)2
< 0 and @SWj(QC)
@qki
= 2
2
(+2)(3+2)2
> 0.
Take dqik = qik and dqki = q

ki where q

ik and q

ki are Cournot equilibrium for
the cover C 0; qik = ( + 3)n(42 + 13 + 72) and qki = 4( + 2)n(3(42 +
13+72)): So we get, dSWj(QC) =
( 2)2(+)2
(3+2)2(42+13+72)
< 0:Hence, SWj(QC0) <
SWj(QC).
As we see from the example, in two covers, the country j is in an union with
the same country i: In cover C, the country i is only in a union with j, while in C 0
it is also in an union with k: We observe that the social welfare of the country j
decreases when i is in a union with a di¤erent country, k.
Lemma 1 Let C 2 CN , and let C 0 2 CN . Let j 2 N: Assume that fjk 2 N : 9H 2 C
such that jk; j 2 H and j 6= jkg = fjk 2 N : 9H 0 2 C 0 such that jk; j 2 H 0 and
j 6= jkg = fj1; ::; jmg:If 8jk 2 fj1; ::; jmg; jfi 2 N : 9H 2 C such that jk; i 2 Hgj 
jfi 2 N : 9H 0 2 C 0 such that jk; i 2 H 0gj then, we have SWj(QC0)  SWj(QC):
Proof. Let C 2 CN and let C 0 2 CN : Let j 2 N: Assume that fjk 2 N : 9H 2 C
such that jk; j 2 H, and j 6= jkg = fjk 2 N : 9H 0 2 C 0 such that jk; j 2 H 0, and
j 6= jkg = fj1; ::; jmg:If 8jk 2 fj1; ::; jmg; jfi 2 N : 9H 2 C such that jk; i 2 Hgj =
jfi 2 N : 9H 0 2 C 0 such that jk; i 2 H 0gj then we have SWj(QC0) = SWj(QC):
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Suppose 9jk 2 fj1; ::; jmg; such that jfi 2 N : 9H 2 C such that jk; i 2 Hgj <
jfi 2 N : 9H 0 2 C 0 such that jk; i 2 H 0gj.Without loss of generality, assume that,
fi 2 N : 9H 0 2 C 0 such that jk; i 2 H 0g = fi 2 N : 9H 2 C such that jk; i 2
HgSfsg, where s 2 N . In C; since there is no connection between jk and s;so qjks
= 0 and qsjk = 0: In C
0, in equilibrium, qjks  0 and qsjk  0:We will show that the
increase in qjks and qsjk will e¤ect the quantity levels, qjj1 ; qj1j; : : : ; qjjk ; qjkj; : : : ; qjjm ;
qjmj; qjj in equilibrium. Then we will show that SWj(QC0) < SWj(QC).
For the cover C, the Cournot equilibrium for quantity levels can be written in
the equations form, such that, Fl : Re ! R
where e = jf(t; r) : 9H 2 C such that t; r 2 H; where t; r 2 f1; :::nggj. Hence,
8qtr such that 9H 2 C : t; r 2 H; where t; r 2 f1; :::ng, we have
F1(q11; : : : ; qnn) = (2 + )q11   + 
X
t2Nnf1g st
9H2C: t;12H
qt1+ 
X
k2Nnf1g st
9H2C: 1;k2H
q1k = 0
...
...
Fe(q11; : : : ; qnn) = (2 + )qnn   + 
X
t2Nnfng st
9H2C: t;n2H
qtn+ 
X
k2Nnfng st
9H2C: n;k2H
qnk = 0
Now, Fl is linear 8l 2 f1; :::eg and by Remark 1, @(F1;:::;Fe)@(q11;:::;qnn) = det(DC) > 0,
and qjks, qsjk are independent and all qtr s such that 9H 2 C : t; r 2 H; where
t; r 2 f1; :::ng are dependent variables. By Cramers rule we have, given qtr such
that 9H 2 C : t; r 2 H; where t; r 2 f1; :::ng,
@qtr
@qjks
=
  @(F1;:::;Fe)
@(q11;:::;qjks:::;qnn)
@(F1;:::;Fe)
@(q11;:::;qnn)
=
 

264
@F1
@q11
   @F1
@qjks
   @F1
@qnn
...
...
...
@Fe
@q11
: : : @Fe
@qjks
: : : @Fe
@qnn
375

264
@F1
@q11
   @F1
@qtr
   @F1
@qnn
...
...
...
@Fe
@q11
: : : @Fe
@qtr
: : : @Fe
@qnn
375

similarly, @qtr
@qsjk
is written.
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Let x =
264
@F1
@qjks
...
@Fe
@qjks
375
(ex1)
be the column vector, then, xl1 =
8><>:
, if @Fl
@qjks
= 
, if @Fl
@qjks
= 
0, if @Fl
@qjks
= 0
similarly, let y =
264
@F1
@qsjk
...
@Fe
@qsjk
375
(ex1)
be the column vector, then,
yl1 =
8><>:
, if @Fl
@qsjk
= 
, if @Fl
@qsjk
= 
0, if @Fl
@qsjk
= 0
Then, @qtr
@qjks
< 0 if t = jk and r 6= s, @qtr@qjks < 0 if t 6= jk and r = s,
@qtr
@qjks
> 0
if t 6= jk and r 6= s, where t, r; jk and s are in a connected bipartite graph in
C 0.Similar reasoning holds for @qtr
@qsjk
. Now, by total di¤erentiation, dSWj(QC) =
@SWj(QC)
@qjks
dqjks +
@SWj(QC)
@qsjk
dqsjk . Here,
@SWj(QC)
@qjks
< 0; and @SWj(QC)
@qsjk
> 0: Take dqjks =
qjks and dqsjk = q

sjk
where qjks and q

sjk
are Cournot equilibrium for the cover C 0;
so, we get, dSWj(QC) < 0: Hence, SWj(QC0) < SWj(QC).
Corollary 1 Let i 2 N and C 2 CN : The country i reaches its maximum social
welfare if and only if it is the center of the single-centered star cover.
Proof. Let i 2 N and C 2 CN . If jN j = 1, it is trivial. If jN j = 2, then by
Proposition 1, the result follows. Hence assume that jN j  3. Assume that C 2 CN
is a star cover, and i is the center of the star where all hyperlinks have only two
countries.Then given D = (32 + 6 + 32n+ 5n+ 42n+ 2cn2 + 2n2)
SWi(QC) = (
2(163 + 202 + 42   23n + 522n + 442n + 113n2 +
62n2+452n2+163n2+23n3+202n3+42n3+83n3+2n4+82n4+
3n4))n(2:D2) and 8j 2 Nnfig we have,
SWj(QC) = (
2(243 + 242 + 42 + 123n + 682n + 442n + 63n2 +
252n2+ 492n2+163n2+82n3+122n3+83n3+32n4+ 3n4))n(2:D2)
Now, SWi(QC)   SWj(QC) = ( 2( 2 + n)(4 + 2 + n + 5n)( + 2n +
n2))n(2:D2)
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Since n  3 and since in our model we assume that  > 0;  > 0,  > 0, so
8j 2 Nnfig : SWi(QC) > SWj(QC).
Thus the center i has strictly more social welfare than others.
Now we will prove that i has the maximum social welfare in the single-centered
star cover than in other covers. Suppose contrary, suppose there exist a cover
C 0 2 CN such that i reaches its maximum social welfare. Then there are two cases;
Case 1: i is isolated in C 0. Then, SWi(QC0) =
2(3+)
2(2+)2
: Hence,
SWi(QC) SWi(QC0) = (2( 1+n)( 374+254n 273+43n3 44 
94n2 + 54n3   113n + 563n2   3222n + 3222n2   153n2+ 213n3 +
3222 + 84n2 + 2422n3))n (2(2 + )2:D2)
Since n  3 and since in our model we assume that  > 0;  > 0,  > 0, so
SWi(QC)  SWi(QC0) > 0: Hence, i cannot be isolated in C 0:
Case 2: i is not isolated in C 0. Then 9 fj1; :::; jm 1g  N such that 8jk 2
fj1; :::; jm 1g;9H 0 2 C 0 such that i; jk 2 H 0: Then by Lemma 1, for the country i;
in order to reach its maximum social welfare, C 0 be such that,
C 0 = fij1; ij2; :::; ijm; H 01; :::; H 0kg where H 01; :::; H 0k are other hyperlinks in C 0:
By Lemma 1, it should be 8jk 2 fj1; :::; jm 1g; jk =2 H 0l ; 8l 2 f1; :::; kg and
i =2 H 0l ; 8l 2 f1; :::; kg. But then, by above calculation,
SWi(QC0) = (
2(163+202 +42  23m+522m+442m+113m2+
62m2 + 452m2 + 163m2 + 23m3 + 202m3 + 42m3 + 83m3 + 2m4 +
82m4 + 3m4))n(2:P 2)
where P = (32 + 6 + 32m+ 5m+ 42m+ 2cm2 + 2m2)
Since m  2 and since in our model we assume that  > 0;  > 0,  > 0,
so, @SWi(QC0 )
@m
> 0. Hence, SWi(QC) > SWi(QC0):Thus, contradiction. Hence, the
country i reaches its maximum social welfare if it is the center of the single-centered
star cover.
Now, assume that i has the maximum social welfare, we will prove that i is the
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center of the single-centered star cover.First of all, i cannot be isolated by case 1
of the rst part of the proof. Hence, i is not isolated. Then by case 2 of the rst
part of the proof, it follows that, i reaches its maximum social welfare then it is the
center of the single-centered star cover. Hence, the country i reaches its maximum
social welfare if and only if it is the center of the single-centered star cover.
Given a cover C 2 CN and given two countries, i and j, assume that i and j are
not in a union together. Moreover, assume that there exist a country, say, k, which
is in a union of both of these countries. Then, if i and j decide to form a union
between them without exiting from their recent unions, then their social welfare
increases, and by Lemma 1, the social welfare of k decreases. Before we state and
prove this observation, we will give an example,
Example 4 N = fi; j; kg. Let C = fik; kjg and let C 0 = fik; kj; ijg: We will
show that adding the hyperlink ij increases the social welfare of i and j:In C; since
there is no connection between i and j, so qij = qji = 0: In C 0, in equilibrium,
qij  0 and qji  0:We will show that the increase in qij and qji will e¤ect the
quantity levels, qii; qik; qki; qjj; qjk; qkj; qkk in equilibrium. Then we will show that
SWj(QC) < SWj(QC0). Note that in this example, SWj(QC) = SWi(QC) and
SWj(QC0) = SWi(QC0).
Given the cover C 2 CN , Cournot equilibrium for quantity levels can be written
in the matrix form,  +DCQC  0 where
DC =
2666666664
2 +    0 0 0 0
 2 +  0 0  0 
 0 2 +  0 0  
0 0 0 2 +    0
0  0  2 +  0 
0 0   0 2 +  
0   0   2 + 
3777777775
and
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QC =
2666666664
qii
qik
qki
qjj
qjk
qkj
qkk
3777777775
For the cover C, the Cournot equilibrium for quantity levels can be written in
the equations form, such that, Fl : R7 ! R where qii; qik; qki; qjj; qjk; qkj; qkk, are
dependent variables, and qij; qji are independent variables, so,
F1(qii; qik; qki; qjj; qjk; qkj; qkk) = (2 + )qii   + qki+ qik = 0
...
...
F7(qii; qik; qki; qjj; qjk; qkj; qkk) = (2 + )qkk   + (qik + qjk)+ (qki + qkj) = 0
Now, Fl is linear 8l 2 f1; :::; 7g and by Remark 1, @(F1;:::;F7)@(qii;:::;qkk) = det(DC) > 0:By
Cramers rule we have, given qtr 2 fqii; qik; qki; qjj; qjk; qkj; qkkg
@qtr
@qij
=
  @(F1;:::;;F7)
@(qii;:::;qij ;:::;qkk)
@(F1;:::;F7)
@(qii;:::;qkk)
=
 

2666664
@F1
@qii
   @F1
@qij
   @F1
@qkk
...
...
...
@F7
@qii
: : : @F7
@qij
: : : @F7
@qkk
3777775

266664
@F1
@qii
   @F1
@qtr
   @F1
@qkk
...
...
...
@F7
@qii
: : : @F7
@qtr
: : : @F7
@qkk
377775

similarly, @qtr
@qji
can be written.
Let x =
264
@F1
@qij
...
@F7
@qij
375
(7x1)
be the column vector, then, x =
2666666664


0

0

0
3777777775
similarly, let y =
264
@F1
@qji
...
@F7
@qji
375
(7x1)
be the column vector, then, y =
2666666664

0



0
0
3777777775
Note that, ; ;  > 0, then,
@qii
@qij
=
@qjj
@qji
= ( 1)(12
3+552+662+273)
(3(3+5)(42+13+72))
< 0;
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@qii
@qji
=
@qjj
@qij
= ( 1)(28
2+842+483)
(3(3+5)(42+13+72))
< 0;
@qik
@qij
=
@qjk
@qji
= ( 1)(12
3+552+862+393)
(3(3+5)(42+13+72))
< 0;
@qik
@qji
=
@qjk
@qij
= (20
2+522+243)
(3(3+5)(42+13+72))
> 0;
@qki
@qij
=
@qkj
@qji
= (5
2+182+93)
((3+5)(42+13+72))
> 0;
@qki
@qji
=
@qkj
@qij
= ( 1)(11
2+342+193)
((3+5)(42+13+72))
< 0 and
@qkk
@qji
= @qkk
@qij
= 5+3
2
3(42+13+72)
> 0.
Now, by total di¤erentiation, dSWj(QC) =
@SWj(QC)
@qij
dqij +
@SWj(QC)
@qji
dqji
Then, @SWj(QC)
@qij
= (+3)(144
3+5192+4982+1193)
(9(3+5)(42+13+72)2)
> 0;
and @SWj(QC)
@qji
= ( 1)((+3)(45
2+66+492))
(9(3+5)(42+13+72)2)
< 0
Take dqij = qij and dqji = q

ji where q

ij and q

ji are Cournot equilibrium for the
cover C 0; qij = q

ji = n(4 + 3):
Thus we get, dSWj(QC) =
22(+3)(242+39+72)
(9(4+3)(42+13+72)2)
> 0:
Hence, SWj(QC) < SWj(QC0) so, SWi(QC) < SWi(QC0):
As we see from the example, if we form a new union from indirectly connected
countries, i and j, then, the social welfare of those countries increases. Now we will
prove this observation as a lemma.
Lemma 2 Let jN j  3. Let C 2 CN and i; j; k 2 N .Assume 9H 2 C such that
i; k 2 H and 9 eH 2 C such that j; k 2 eH but, @H 2 C such that i; j 2 H. If C 0 =
fH 2 C;8H 2 CgSfijg, then SWi(QC) < SWi(QC0) and SWj(QC) < SWj(QC0).
Proof. Let jN j  3. Let C 2 CN and i; j; k 2 N . Assume 9H 2 C such that
i; k 2 H and 9 eH 2 C such that j; k 2 eH but, @H 2 C such that i; j 2 H. Let
C 0 = fH 2 C;8H 2 CgSfijg, then we will prove that SWi(QC) < SWi(QC0) and
SWj(QC) < SWj(QC0).
In C; since there is no connection between i and j;so qji = qij = 0: In C 0, in
equilibrium, qji  0 and qij  0:We will show that how the increase in qji and qij
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will e¤ect the quantity levels, qis; qsi where s 2 Nnfjg in equilibrium. Then we will
show that SWi(QC) < SWi(QC0).
For the cover C, the Cournot equilibrium for quantity levels can be written in
the equations form, such that, Fl : Re ! R where
e = jf(t; r) : 9H 2 C such that t; r 2 H; where t; r 2 f1; :::nggj.
Hence, 8qtr such that 9H 2 C : t; r 2 H; where t; r 2 f1; :::ng, we have
F1(q11; : : : ; qnn) = (2 + )q11   + 
X
t2Nnf1g st
9H2C: t;12H
qt1+ 
X
k2Nnf1g st
9H2C: 1;k2H
q1k = 0
...
...
...
Fe(q11; : : : ; qnn) = (2 + )qnn   + 
X
t2Nnfng st
9H2C: t;n2H
qtn+ 
X
k2Nnfng st
9H2C: n;k2H
qnk = 0
Now, Fl is linear 8l 2 f1; :::eg and by Remark 1, @(F1;:::;Fe)@(q11;:::;qnn) = det(DC) > 0.
Also, qij, qji are independent and all other qtr s such that 9H 2 C : t; r 2 H; where
t; r 2 f1; :::ng are dependent variables. By Cramers rule we have, given qtr such
that 9H 2 C : t; r 2 H; where t; r 2 f1; :::ng, and qtr 6= qij , qtr 6= qji
@qtr
@qij
=
  @(F1;:::;Fe)
@(q11;:::;qij :::;qnn)
@(F1;:::;Fe)
@(q11;:::;qnn)
=
 

2666664
@F1
@q11
   @F1
@qij
   @F1
@qnn
...
...
...
@Fe
@q11
: : : @Fe
@qij
: : : @Fe
@qnn
3777775

266664
@F1
@q11
   @F1
@qtr
   @F1
@qnn
...
...
...
@Fe
@q11
: : : @Fe
@qtr
: : : @Fe
@qnn
377775

similarly @qtr
@qji
is written.
Let x =
264
@F1
@qij
...
@Fe
@qij
375
(ex1)
be the column vector, then, xl1 =
8><>:
, if @Fl
@qij
= 
, if @Fl
@qij
= 
0, if @Fl
@qij
= 0
similarly, let y =
264
@F1
@qji
...
@Fe
@qji
375
(ex1)
be the column vector,
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then, yl1 =
8><>:
, if @Fl
@qji
= 
, if @Fl
@qji
= 
0, if @Fl
@qji
= 0
Then, @qtr
@qij
< 0 if t = i and r 6= j, @qtr
@qij
< 0 if t 6= i and r = j, @qtr
@qij
> 0 if t 6= i
and r 6= j, where t, r; i and j are in a connected bipartite graph in C 0.
Similar reasoning holds for @qtr
@qji
.
Now, by total di¤erentiation, dSWi(QC) =
@SWi(QC)
@qij
dqij +
@SWi(QC)
@qji
dqji
Here, @SWi(QC)
@qij
< 0; and @SWi(QC)
@qji
> 0: Take dqij = qij and dqji = q

ji where q

ij
and qji are Cournot equilibrium for the cover C
0; so, we get, dSWi(QC) > 0:
Hence, SWi(QC0) > SWi(QC), and similarly, SWj(QC0) > SWj(QC).
Lemma 3 Let C 2 CN :Let jN j = n > 1: Assume 9!d 2 f0; :::n   2g such that
8i 2 N; degi(C) = d. Then, complete-equivalent cover strictly increases the social
welfare of all countries.
Proof. Let C 2 CN :Let jN j > 1: Assume 9!d 2 f0; :::n   2g such that 8i 2 N;
degi(C) = d. Hence in equilibrium we have,8i; j 2 N : 9H 2 C such that i; j 2 H;
qii = q

ij = q

ji = q

jj = n( 2 +  + d+ d) so, SWi(QC) = 
2(1+d)(3++d+d)
2(2++d+d)2
.
Let C 0 2 CN be complete-equivalent cover, then by Proposation 1, we have
SWi(QC0) =
2n(2+n+n)
2(+n+n)2
: Hence, we have 8i 2 N;
SWi(QC0)   SWi(QC) = 2
2(n d 1)(3++d+d+n+n)
2(2++d+d)2(+n+n)2
> 0 as d < n   1;and
; ;  > 0:
Hence,complete- equivalent cover strictly increases the social welfare of all coun-
tries. Note that, if d = n  1 then the cover is complete-equivalent cover.
In our model, the allocation rule and the value of a cover, is attained by the
social welfare of each country. Hence, given C 2 CN , we have 8i 2 N , Yi(C) =
SWi(QC)  2(3+)2(2+)2 , here 
2(3+)
2(2+)2
represents the social welfare of a country when it
is isolated. Therefore, v(C) = 0 whenever jHj = 1 for all H 2 C and given C 2 CN ,
we have v(C) =
P
i2N
Yi(C). However, in order to make calculations clear and easy,
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instead of dealing with the allocation rule, we will utilize social welfare concept in
our proofs.
Now we will examine the core stable covers under given one of the four member-
ship rights, free exit-free entry, free exit-approved entry, approved exit-free entry, or
approved exit-approved entry.
Theorem 1 Let (v; Y ) is given above. A cover C 2 CN is core stable relative to
(v; Y ) under given one of the four membership rights, FX-FE, FX-AE, AX-FE, or
AX-AE if and only if it is a complete-equivalent cover.
Proof. First of all, if jN j = 1 the result follows trivially. If jN j = 2, the result
follows from Proposition 1. Thus assume that jN j  3.
Let C 2 CN is core stable relative to (v; Y ) under given one of the four mem-
bership rights, FX-FE, FX-AE, AX-FE, or AX-AE. We will prove that C 2 CN is
a complete-equivalent cover: Suppose contrary, then 9i; j 2 N such that @H 2 C :
i; j 2 H: Then there are two cases,
Case 1: 8H;H 2 C, we have HTH = ;. Then 8i 2 N , 9!H 2 C such that
i 2 H. By Proposition 1, SWi(QC) = 2m(2+m+m)2(+m+m)2 where jHj = m.
Let T = N , and C 0 be a complete-equivalent cover. Then, C 0  ff(H)SP :
H 2 C;P 2 2TgS 2T for some T -function f on C, where f(H) = H ,8H 2 C:
Now, 8i 2 N by Proposition 1, SWi(QC0) = 2n(2+n+n)2(+n+n)2 . Since, n > m, so by
Proposition 1, SWi(QC0) > SWi(QC). Now, C 0 is obtainable from C via T relative
to v and Y under given one of the four membership rights, FX-FE, FX-AE, AX-FE,
or AX-AE and T can improve upon C via C 0 relative to (v; Y ) under given exit- entry
condition. Thus, the cover C is not core stable relative to (v; Y ) . Contradiction.
Therefore, 9H;H 2 C, such that HTH 6= ;.
Case 2: 9H;H 2 C, such that HTH 6= ;. By cover denition, Hn(HTH) 6= ;
and Hn(HTH) 6= ;. Let i 2 Hn(HTH) and j 2 Hn(HTH) and k 2 HTH.
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Then, i; k 2 H and j; k 2 H.
Let T = fi; jg and C 0 = CSfijg. Then, C  ff(H)SP : H 2 C;P 2 2TgS 2T
for some T -function f on C, where f(H) = H ,8H 2 C: Since, C 0 = CSfijg, so C 0
is obtainable from C via T relative to (v; Y ) under given one of the four membership
rights, FX-FE, FX-AE, AX-FE, or AX-AE. By Lemma 2, SWi(QC0) > SWi(QC)
and SWj(QC0) > SWj(QC). Therefore, T can improve upon C via C 0 relative to
(v; Y ) under given exit- entry condition. Thus, the cover C is not core stable relative
to (v; Y ). Contradiction. Therefore, C is a complete- equivalent cover.
Conversely, assume that, C 2 CN is a complete-equivalent cover. We will prove
that C 2 CN is core stable relative to (v; Y ) under given one of the four membership
rights, FX-FE, FX-AE, AX-FE, or AX-AE .
Suppose contrary, then 9T 2 2Nnf;g and 9C 0 2 CN ,which is obtainable from
C via T relative to v and Y under FX-FE, FX-AE, AX-FE, or AX-AE, such that
T can improve upon C via C 0 relative to (v; Y ) under FX-FE, FX-AE, AX-FE, or
AX-AE. Hence, 8i 2 T , SWi(QC)  SWi(QC0) and 9j 2 T , SWj(QC) < SWj(QC0).
Now if T = fig, then the only obtainable cover from C via T relative to (v; Y )
under FX-FE, FX-AE, AX-FE, or AX-AE, is C 0 = fH;H 0g where H = Nnfig and
H 0 = fig. By Proposition 1, SWi(QC0) < SWi(QC) since 1 < n. Contradiction to
the fact that 8i 2 T , SWi(QC)  SWi(QC0) . Hence, jT j  2.
Now let i 2 T and 8H 2 C 0 such that i 2 H, we have 8H 0 2 C 0 , HTH 0 =
;.Then given jHj = m, since m < n, by Proposition 1,SWi(QC0) < SWi(QC).
Contradiction to the fact that 8i 2 T , SWi(QC)  SWi(QC0). Thus, 8i 2 T and
8H 2 C 0such that i 2 H, we have 9H 0 2 C 0 , HTH 0 6= ; where H 6= H 0.
Now let i 2 T and assume 9!H 2 C 0such that i 2 H and 9H 0 2 C 0 such that
H
T
H 0 6= ; where H 6= H 0.Let C 00 be a cover such that
C 00 = fH : H 2 C 0, H 6= H , and H 6= H 0 where H 0 2 C 0 such that HTH 0 6=
;gSfH 0n(HTH 0) : H 0 2 C 0 such that HTH 0 6= ; where H 6= H 0gSfHg
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By Lemma 1, SWi(QC0) < SWi(QC00). In C 00, 9! eH 2 C 00such that i 2 eH, we
have 8H 00 2 C 00 , eHTH 00 = ;. By above part of the proof, SWi(QC00) < SWi(QC).
Hence, by transitivity, SWi(QC0) < SWi(QC).Contradiction to the fact that 8i 2 T ,
SWi(QC)  SWi(QC0) .
Hence, 8i 2 T , 9 H;H 0 2 C 0such that i 2 HTH 0, where H 6= H 0. 8i 2 T;
dene 8i 2 T , degi(C 0)  2. Now assume that, 9!d such that 8i 2 T , degi(C 0) = d.
Note that, by the denition of T -function f on C, and since C 0 is not a complete-
equivalent cover, d < n   1. Then by Lemma 3, 8i 2 T , SWi(QC0) < SWi(QC).
Contradiction to the fact that 8i 2 T , SWi(QC)  SWi(QC0).
Thus, assume that @!d such that 8i 2 T , degi(C 0) = d. Then 9t 2 T such
that degt(C
0) = minfdegi(C 0) : i 2 Tg. Now let C 00 be a cover such that 8i 2 T ,
degi(C
00) = degt(C
0). Then by Lemma 1, SWt(QC0)  SWt(QC00). Note that,
by the denition of T -function f on C, degt(C
0), and since C 0 is not a complete
cover, degt(C
0) < n   1. Then by Lemma 3, SWt(QC00) < SWt(QC). Hence, for
t 2 T , SWt(QC0) < SWt(QC).Contradiction to the fact that 8i 2 T , SWi(QC) 
SWi(QC0).
Thus, @T 2 2Nnf;g and @C 0 2 CN ,which is obtainable from C via T relative
to v and Y under FX-FE, FX-AE, AX-FE, or AX-AE, is such that T can improve
upon C via C 0 relative to (v; Y ) under FX-FE, FX-AE, AX-FE, or AX-AE. Hence,
C 2 CN is core stable relative to (v; Y ) under FX-FE, FX-AE, AX-FE, or AX-AE.
Now we nd core stable covers relative to (v; Y ) under free exit- strongly ap-
proved entry condition.
Proposition 2 Let v 2 V , be any value function and Y allocation rule associated
with the value function v. Let C 2 CN be a core stable cover relative to (v; Y ) under
FX-FE. Then it is core stable cover relative to (v; Y ) under FX-SAE or AX-SAE.
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Proof. Let v 2 V , be any value function and Y allocation rule associated with
the value function v. Let C 2 CN be a core stable cover relative to (v; Y ) under
FX-FE. Thus, given any T 2 2Nnf;g, 8C 0 2 CN where C 0  ff(H)SP : H 2
C;P 2 2TgS 2T for some T function f on C, T does not improve upon C via C 0
relative to (v; Y ). Thus, @T 2 2Nnf;g and @C 0 2 CN ,which is obtainable from C
via T relative to v and Y under FX-SAE or AX-SAE, is such that T can improve
upon C via C 0 relative to (v; Y ) under FX-SAE or AX-SAE. Hence, C 2 CN is core
stable relative to (v; Y ) under FX-SAE or AX-SAE.
Theorem 2 Complete-equivalent cover is core stable under free exit- strongly ap-
proved entry. For jN j  3, it is the only core stable cover under FX-SAE.
Proof. First of all, we will prove that complete-equivalent cover is core stable
relative to (v; Y ) under FX-SAE. It follows from Theorem 1, and Proposition 2.
Now we will prove that for jN j  3, it is the only core stable cover.
For jN j = 1 and jN j = 2, the result is trivial.
For jN j = 3, and N = fi; j; kg, by Proposition 1, we only consider the cover,
C 0 = fij; jkg. For T = fi; kg, and C 00 = fik; jg, by Lemma 2, and by the denition
of FX-SAE, T can improve upon C 0 via C 00 relative to (v; Y ) under FX-SAE. Hence,
C 0 2 CN is not core stable relative to (v; Y ) under FX-SAE. Therefore, for jN j  3,
complete-equivalent cover is the only core stable cover relative to (v; Y ) under FX-
SAE.
Remark 2 For jN j  4, and for some parameters  and , there are other covers
which are core stable relative to (v; Y ) under FX-SAE.
Example 5 Consider jN j = 4, and N = fi; j; k; lg by Proposition 1,by above case,
we only need to consider these covers or equilvalents of them;
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Let C 0 = fij; jk; klg. For T = fi; lg, and C 00 = fil; jkg, by Lemma 2, and by the
denition, T can improve upon C 0 via C 00 relative to (v; Y ) under FX-SAE. Hence,
C 0 2 CN is not core stable relative to (v; Y ) under FX-SAE.
Let C 0 = fij; jk; kl; ilg. For T = N , and C 00 = filjkg, by Lemma 3, T can
improve upon C 0 via C 00 relative to relative to (v; Y ) under FX-SAE. Hence, C 0 2 CN
is not core stable relative to (v; Y ) under FX-SAE.
Let C 0 = fij; jklg. For T = fi; k; lg, and C 00 = fikl; jg, by Lemma 1, and by the
denition, T can improve upon C 0 via C 00 relative to (v; Y ) under FX-SAE. Hence,
C 0 2 CN is not core stable relative to (v; Y ) under FX-SAE.
Let C 0 = fij; ik; ilg. For T = fk; lg, and C 00 = fij; klg, by Lemma 2, and by the
denition of free exit- strongly approved entry condition, T can improve upon C 0 via
C 00 relative to (v; Y ) under FX-SAE. Hence, C 0 2 CN is not core stable relative to
(v; Y ) under FX-SAE.
Let C = fijk; jklg. For T = fi; lg, and C 0 = fil; jkg, by direct calculations we
have
SWi(QC0)  SWi(QC) = 
2(64   1833   92022 + 6853 + 9884)
6(3 + 2)2(102 + 51 + 352)2
similar result is valid for the country l.Now, C is not core stable if  > 0,  = .
By direct calculations we have,SWi(QC0)  SWi(QC) = 22400 > 0.
Now we will prove that C is core stable relative to (v; Y ) under FX-SAE if  > 0,
 = (1n2).
Suppose contrary, then 9T 2 2Nnf;g and 9C 0 2 CN ,which is obtainable from
C via T relative to (v; Y ) under FX-SAE, such that T can improve upon C via C 0
relative to (v; Y ) under FX-SAE. Hence, 8t 2 T; SWt(QC0)  SWt(QC). Trivially
jT j 6= 1.
If T = fi; lg then we only need to consider C 0 = fil; jkg, since SWi(QC0)  
SWi(QC) =
 13452
1503792
< 0. Hence,T cannot improve upon C via C 0 relative to (v; Y )
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under FX-SAE. Thus, T  fi; lg. But then 8T 2 2Nnf;g such that j 2 T (or
k 2 T ) by Lemma 1,2 and 3, @C 0 2 CN ,which is obtainable from C via T relative to
v and Y under FX-SAE, such that T can improve upon C via C 0 relative to (v; Y )
under FX-SAE. Thus, C is core stable relative to (v; Y ) under FX-SAE
Now, we will nd the core stable covers under approved exit- strongly approved
entry.
Corollary 2 Given (v ;Y ) in the model, complete-equivalent cover is core stable
relative to (v ;Y ) under AX-SAE.
Proof. Proof follows from Theorem 1, and Proposition 2.
Theorem 3 Given (v ;Y ) in the model, star cover is core stable relative to (v ;Y )
under strongly approved exit-approved entry condition.
Proof. Let C 2 CN be a star cover.Then, the cover has at least two hyperlinks,
9S 2 2Nnf;; Ng, such that 8H;H 0 2 C; HTH 0 = S. We will prove that C is core
stable relative to (v; Y ) under AX-SAE.
Suppose contrary, then 9T 2 2Nnf;g and 9C 0 2 CN ,which is obtainable from
C via T relative to v and Y under AX-SAE, such that T can improve upon C via
C 0 relative to (v; Y ) under AX-SAE. Hence, 8i 2 T , SWi(QC)  SWi(QC0) and
9j 2 T , SWj(QC) < SWj(QC0). Now, by the denition of AX-SAE and since C is
a star, so 8T 2 2Nnf;g and 8C 0 2 CN ,which is obtainable from C via T relative
to v and Y under AX-SAE,8k 2 S, SWk(QC)  SWk(QC0) should be. If jSj = 1,
by Corollary 1, 8C 0 2 CN we have SWk(QC) > SWk(QC0), if jSj 6= 1 by Lemma
1,2 and 3, 9k 2 S such that SWk(QC) > SWk(QC0) . Contradiction. Hence, @T
2 2Nnf;g and @C 0 2 CN ,which is obtainable from C via T relative to v and Y
under AX-SAE, such that T can improve upon C via C 0 relative to (v; Y ) under
AX-SAE. Thus, star cover is core stable relative to (v; Y ) under AX-SAE.
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Now we will consider the e¢ cient, Pareto e¢ cient covers under the membership
rights.
For networks, Jackson (2003) notes that, a network is e¢ cient relative to a value
function if it is Pareto e¢ cient relative to the value function and for all allocation
rules .Thus, as Jackson (2003) states for networks "E¢ ciency is the more natural
notion in situations where there is some freedom to reallocate value through transfers,
while Pareto e¢ ciency might be more reasonable in contexts where the allocation
rule is xed (and we are not able or willing to make further transfers or to make
interpersonal comparisons of utility)."
For covers, the same reasoning is valid.
Remark 3 Note that, given any (v; Y ) and given a membership right, if a cover
is core stable relative to (v; Y ) then it is Pareto e¢ cient relative to (v; Y ). Thus,
complete-equivalent cover is Pareto e¢ cient relative to (v; Y ) under all membership
rights. However, star cover is Pareto e¢ cient relative to (v; Y ) but it is not core
stable under some rights structures. Similarly, complete- equivalent cover is the
e¢ cient cover but star is not e¢ cient.
4.2 Model with Linkage Cost
So far in our analysis we assume that the entry to a union does not require cost.
However, in reality, countries pay cost when they enter to a union and the countries
in that union pay cost for the new comer. For instance, Turkey is a candidate
for European Union. In order to join European Union, a new ministery, European
Union Ministery, has been established, and some cost has been spent for controlling
whether the trade products satisfy EU criteria or not. Similarly, EU countries has
sent some funds to Turkey in order Turkey to be ready for EU. Hence, both sides
pay cost.
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Let i 2 N and let Cn 2 CN be complete- equivalent cover. Let C1 = fig and let
Cn = fi1i2:::ing. Dene; 8n > 1;8k < n;
f1;n = SWi(QCn)  SWi(QC1) where n > 1.
fk;n = [SWi(QCn)  SWi(QCk)]n(n  k) where n > k:
Then we have 8t; p  1 and r; y  2,
fp;r < ft;y if and only if one of them holds;
8<:
[p = t = 1 and r < y] or
[t < p] or
[t = p 6= 1 and r > y]
Hence, jN j = n we have,
f(n 1);n < f(n 2);n < ::: < f2;4 < f2;3 < f1;2 < ::: < f1;n (0)
Note that fp;r > 0,8p; r  1: We also have;
f1;3 = f1;2 + f2;3
f1;4 = f1;2 + f2;3 + f3;4 = f1;3 + f3;4
...
...
...
f1;n = f1;(n 1) + f(n 1);n (1)
Dene M as constant cost and m as the variable cost. Assume m  M . If a
country is isolated, in order to join a union, H, it pays M + jHj :m, similarly in
that union, the countries pay m as a cost for the new comer. If a country is not
isolated, in order to join a union, it will only pay cost for the countries which had
not connection with it previously. Similarly, in that union, the countries which had
not connection with the new comer at past, pay cost. Hence, while entrance requires
cost, exit will be costless. Given C 2 CN ; i 2 N; dene social welfare of a country i
in the "cost" case as SW i(QC):Then,
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SW i(QC) =

SWi(QC) if degi(C) = 0
SWi(QC) M   degi(C):m otherwise
Then the value function, v 2 V and the associated allocation rule, Y is attained
by the social welfare of each country. Hence, given C 2 CN , we have 8i 2 N ,
Y i(C) = SW i(QC)  2(3+)2(2+)2 , here 
2(3+)
2(2+)2
represents the social welfare of a country
when it is isolated. Therefore, v(C) = 0 whenever jHj = 1 for all H 2 C and given
C 2 CN , we have v(C) = P
i2N
Y i(C).
We will prove an observation as a claim:
Claim 2 Let C 2 CN ; jN j = n  3. If M  f2;3 and m  f2;n, then 8k 2
f2; 3; :::; ng we have M + (k   1)m < f1;k:
Proof. Let C 2 CN and let jN j = n  3: Let M  f2;3 and m  f2;n. We will
prove that given n  3;8k 2 f2; 3; :::; ng we haveM +(k 1)m < f1;k:Now we know
that M + (k  1)m  f2;3+ (k  1)f2;n:Hence, given n  3;8k 2 f2; 3; :::; ng we will
prove that f2;3 + (k   1)f2;n < f1;k:
Let n = 3 then for k = 2, by (0) and (1), we have, f2;3 + f2;3 < f1;2. For k = 3,
we have f2;3 + 2:f2;3 < f1;2+ f2;3 = f1;3:
Given arbitrary n  3, we will do induction on k:
If k = 2 then, f2;3+f2;n < f2;3+f2;3 < f1;2. Assume by induction, the assumption
is true 8k  (n  1). Then we will prove for k = n. Now for k = n, we know that
f2;3+ f2;n(n  1) < f2;3+ f2;(n 1)(n  2)+ f2;n since f2;n < f2;(n 1). By induction
assumption, we also know that;
f2;3 + f2;(n 1)(n   2) < f1;(n 1). We want to prove that; f2;3 + f2;n(n   1) <
f1;n.Now,
[f1;n   (n  1):f2;n]  [f1;(n 1)   (n  2)f2;(n 1)] =
22(+)(32 2+2n2 22+2n2+72n+10n+32n+2n2)
2(3+2)2(+n+n)2( +n+n)2 > 0.
Thus, f2;3 + f2;n(n   1) < f1;n. Therefore, given n  3;M  f2;3; and m  f2;n
we have M + (k   1)m < f1;k;8k 2 f2; 3; :::; ng:
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Note that denote core stable as "CS", and not core stable as "NCS". Below two
examples, core stability is considered as core stability relative to (v; Y ):
Now we will make the analysis for jN j = 3.
Let N = fi; j; kg and let C1 = fi; j; kg, C2 = fij; kg; C3 = fij; ikg and C4 =
fijkg. Then;
f1 = SWi(C2)  SWi(C1) = 2
2(5+3)
2(2+)2(3+2)2
= f12
f2 = SWi(C3)  SWi(C1) = 22(55
4+2763+43622+2163+254)
9(2+)2(42+13+72)2
f3 = SWi(C4)  SWi(C1) = 22
2(3+2)
2(2+)2(4+3)2
= f13
f4 = SWi(C3)  SWi(C2) = 2(315
4+15513+259322+17333+4004)
18(3+2)2(42+13+72)2
f5 = SWi(C4)  SWi(C2) = 2
2(7+5)
2(3+2)2(4+3)2
= f23
f6 = SWj(C3)  SWj(C1) = 2(24
4+1803+35522+703 534)
18(2+)2(42+13+72)2
f7 = SWj(C4)  SWj(C3) = 2(336
4+18963+341322+22623+4774)
18(4+3)2(42+13+72)2
Then we have; f5 < f1 < f3 < f4 < f2 and f6 < f7 < f4 and f5 < f7 and f6 < f1.
Now, we know by direct calculations, the core stable covers are;
Result 1: If M  f6 and so m  f6, or if M  f5 and so m  f5 then,
M +m < f12 and M + 2m < f13. Hence, C3 is CS under AX-SAE and C4 is CS
under all rights structures.
Result 2: If f6 < M < f7 and so m < f7 then there are two cases;
Case 1: If M +m < f12 and M + 2m < f13 then, C3 is CS under AX-SAE and
C4 is CS under all structures.
Case 2: If M +m > f12 and M + 2m > f13 then, C1 is CS under AX-AE,FX-
AE,AX-SAE, & FX-SAE, C3 is CS under AX-SAE.
Result 3: If f7 M < f1 and f5  m < f1 then,M+m > f12 andM+2m > f13
hence,C1 is CS under AX-AE,FX-AE,AX-SAE, & FX-SAE, C3 is CS under AX-SAE.
Result 4:f1 M and so m  f1, then for some  and , we have M + 2m > f2,
in this case C1 is CS under all rights structures.
Now, let C4 = fijkg be given. Suppose that,M andm are such thatM+m > f12
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and M + 2m > f13. By the model, we have, 8i 2 N;SW i(C4) < SW i(C1). On the
other hand, when a country exits from a union, it cannot get the cost, which was
spent for entrance, back. We will examine this situation for jN j = 3. Since, for C2;
we always have SWi(C2) > SWi(C1) so, we only need to consider two covers.
1) Let C3 = fij; ikg be given, then, if m  f6 or m  f5 then C3 is CS under
AX-SAE, but if m  f7 then C3 is CS under all rights structures.
2) Let C4 = fijkg be given, and suppose M +m > f12 and M + 2m > f13, then
C4 is CS under all rights structures.
Note that, when there is a linkage cost, core stable covers di¤er according to
; ;  and jN j under di¤erent rights structures.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
In our research, we investigated several questions about stability of covers under
di¤erent rights structures. In order to model our problem, we use the assumptions
and ndings of Ilkilic (2010) to calculate the social welfare of a country in a given
cover structure. Sertel (1992) introduced four possible membership rights in an
abstract setting. In this aspect, either both exit and entry require approval, only
one of them requires approval (i.e., approved entry- free exit or vice versa). We
dene four membership rights for covers, in addition to this, we introduce and dene
strongly approved entry condition for covers. We investigated core stability notion
in all cases respectively. We investigated e¢ cient and Pareto E¢ cient covers.While
examining core stability and exit-entry conditions, we rst considered entry without
linkage cost.Then, we did the same analysis considering entry cost. We concluded
that core stable covers di¤er under di¤erent rights structures.
As we mention before, we assume that countries have the same demand and the
same economic, technological structure. For simplicity, we take one kind of product
which can be produced in all countries with the same technology. In other words,
countries are symmetric. But in reality, it is not. Hence, as a further research,
countrys di¤erences can be considered, and the same questions in terms of this
di¤erence can be answered. Besides, as a further research, transferable payo¤s can
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be considered.
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